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Abstract
Hardware enclaves such as Intel SGX are a promising tech-
nology for improving the security of databases outsourced
to the cloud. These enclaves provide an execution environ-
ment isolated from the hypervisor/OS, and encrypt data in
RAM. However, for applications that use large amounts of
memory, including most databases, enclaves do not protect
against access pattern leaks, which let attackers gain a
large amount of information about the data. Moreover,
the naı¨ve way to address this issue, using Oblivious RAM
(ORAM) primitives from the security literature, adds sub-
stantial overhead.
A number of recent works explore trusted hardware
enclaves as a path toward secure, access-pattern oblivi-
ous outsourcing of data storage and analysis. While these
works efficiently solve specific subproblems (e.g. building
secure indexes or running analytics queries that always
scan entire tables), no prior work has supported oblivious
query processing for general query workloads on a DBMS
engine with multiple access methods. Moreover, apply-
ing these techniques individually does not guarantee that
an end-to-end workload, such as a complex SQL query
over multiple tables, will be oblivious. In this paper, we
introduce ObliDB, an oblivious database engine design
that is the first system to provide obliviousness for general
database read workloads over multiple access methods.
ObliDB introduces a diverse array of new oblivious
physical operators to accelerate oblivious SQL queries,
giving speedups of up to an order of magnitude over naı¨ve
ORAM. It supports a broad range of queries, including
aggregation, joins, insertions, deletions and point queries.
We implement ObliDB and show that, on analytics work-
loads, ObliDB ranges from 1.1–19× faster than Opaque,
a previous oblivious, enclave-based system designed only
for analytics, and comes within 2.6× of Spark SQL, which
provides no security guarantees. In addition, ObliDB sup-
ports point queries with 3–10ms latency, which is com-
parable to index-only trusted hardware systems, and runs
over 7× faster than HIRB, a previous encryption-based
oblivious index system that supports point queries.
1 Introduction
Many organizations outsource their databases to the pub-
lic cloud to take advantage of its cost efficiency, high
availability, and convenience. Due to the sensitivity of
this data, both users and cloud providers would like
strong privacy and security guarantees, ideally protect-
ing against both external attackers and insiders that breach
the cloud provider’s security [13, 19, 76]. To address this
problem, researchers have proposed approaches includ-
ing property preserving encryption [35, 57, 58], trusted
hardware [4, 10, 85], and algorithms to run specific com-
putations securely [54, 78, 81], giving various tradeoffs
between security, generality, and performance.
One of the most promising practical approaches to in-
crease security is the hardware enclave [26, 27]. These
enclaves provide an environment where a remotely verifi-
able piece of code can run without interference from the
hypervisor and OS, accessing a small amount of private
enclave memory and making upcalls to the operating sys-
tem for I/O. Increasing availability of hardware enclaves
has further spurred interest in strong cloud security guaran-
tees [26,27]. Enclaves are already available on many recent
CPUs [6, 26] and will soon be offered on Microsoft and
Google’s public clouds [59, 65], making them a powerful
technology to investigate for secure database hosting [61].
Unfortunately, although enclaves are powerful, they
leave open one key threat: access pattern attacks. Ap-
plications that use an enclave to manage large amounts of
data must still access data through the OS (e.g., to read
new memory pages into the enclave or access the disk),
so an attacker that controls the OS can see the pattern of
1
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
00
45
8v
6 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
9 S
ep
 20
19
addresses being accessed. This leaks a great deal of in-
formation, allowing attackers to learn details of both the
data itself and users’ queries on the data [40, 42, 55, 82].
The special case of encrypted databases has a long his-
tory of surprising leakage at the hands of access pattern
attacks [2, 20, 36, 40, 43, 47, 60, 83].
In response to this threat, research has begun to press to-
ward the goal of general-purpose oblivious (access pattern-
hiding) SQL databases using hardware enclaves. The
generic approach to establishing obliviousness uses Obliv-
ious RAM (ORAM) [37, 74], which guarantees that any
two sets of access patterns are indistinguishable from each
other, so long as they are of the same length. Unfortunately,
conventional query processing algorithms vary both the
addresses and total number of memory accesses depend-
ing on data and queries, rendering generic use of ORAM
alone insufficient. POSUP [41] and Oblix [50] explore
oblivious indexes over encrypted data using specialized
ORAM constructions as building blocks, but do not sup-
port general queries. Moreover, oblivious indexes alone
do not fully solve the security problem: thus, an attacker
can see how many accesses to an index occurred during a
query operator.
On the other hand, Cipherbase [4] and Opaque [85] pro-
pose schemes that hide access patterns, but they are limited
to workloads that scan entire tables. For example, Opaque
relies on oblivious sorts over the entire dataset. These
systems are not efficient for more general workloads that
may also include point queries. Attempts to support gen-
eral workloads, such as Obladi [28] and StealthDB [39],
also lack key features – Obladi does not support indexes
and requires operations to be processed in batches, and
StealthDB does not provide integrity or hide access pat-
terns to indexes. Thus, prior solutions do not provide algo-
rithms for a general-purpose DBMS that combines queries
of varying selectivity, the typical use case for outsourced
databases (e.g. MySQL, Postgres, etc).
Our contributions. This paper introduces ObliDB, the
first engine to provide efficient, oblivious read queries for
relational workloads over multiple access methods. The
key contribution is a set of oblivious query processing al-
gorithms that work efficiently over both entire datasets and
small subsets of data, closing the gap between prior work
and general-purpose databases. Often the direct port of
a standard operator into an oblivious version is not only
slow but also inherently leaky. Our algorithms take ad-
vantage of knowledge about query selectivity to maintain
obliviousness while outperforming naı¨ve oblivious ver-
sions of standard techniques. For example, we offer four
oblivious SELECT algorithms that vary their interaction
with trusted/untrusted memory to achieve obliviousness
while optimizing performance for different settings. Our
algorithms only leak the structure of queries (hiding param-
eters) and the size of the output data, the same as Opaque’s
oblivious mode [85]1.
ObliDB’s performance improves over prior systems by
supporting multiple storage methods and including a query
planner that obliviously chooses the best option among
several algorithms to satisfy a given query. Unlike prior
work, ObliDB provides two storage methods for its tables:
a “flat” one, where the table is encrypted as a contiguous
file and always scanned (as in Opaque and Cipherbase),
and an oblivious B+ tree built over ORAM but modified
to prevent leakage and performance penalties involved in
a direct composition of B+ trees and ORAM. In particular,
we hide the path taken in an index to retrieve records as
well as the changes made to index data structures on inser-
tions and deletions. Each table can be stored using one or
both methods, similarly to how administrators can decide
to create indexes in traditional databases. For instance,
if a table is stored using both methods, ObliDB can use
the index for point queries and the flat table for full-table
aggregation queries.
Choosing between several algorithms to satisfy a query
opens the possibility of leaking information about queries
or data through algorithm choice. ObliDB’s query planner
mitigates this risk by basing optimization decisions on
information already available to the attacker, such as table
and query result sizes.
These features let ObliDB support a wide range of
queries efficiently and securely. ObliDB supports selec-
tions, aggregations and joins, as well as efficient point and
small range lookups, insertions, deletions, and updates.
Since ObliDB’s focus is on obliviously processing read
queries, the engine does not provide full support for trans-
actions, but techniques for concurrency and logging [28]
can be added on top of ObliDB’s algorithms and storage
methods.
We implement ObliDB over Intel SGX [26] and evalu-
1 We also support padding intermediate and final results of complex
queries to a fixed size, similar to Opaque’s pad mode [85], if desired.
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ate it on diverse applications and find that it outperforms
previous oblivious systems and achieves practical perfor-
mance compared to systems with no security guarantees.
For analytics, we compare ObliDB to Opaque [85] on
the Big Data Benchmark [3] and find that it is compet-
itive with Opaque on most queries, but can outperform
Opaque by 19× on queries that can leverage indexes.
ObliDB also comes within 2.6× of Spark SQL [7], which
provides no security guarantees. For point queries, we
compare to an open-source encrypted index and find that
ObliDB outperforms the HIRB + vORAM of Roche et
al. [64] by over 7×. Moreover, point insertions, dele-
tions and selects using ObliDB’s indexes on a 1M row
dataset take 3.6–9.4ms, which is acceptable for many
applications and comparable to the other enclave-based
indexes Oblix [50] and POSUP [41] that do not sup-
port the more general queries handled by ObliDB. Fi-
nally, we show that the choice of physical operators in
ObliDB enables meaningful query optimization, yield-
ing speedups of up to 11×. ObliDB is open source at
https://github.com/SabaEskandarian/ObliDB.
To summarize, our contributions are:
• Oblivious query processing algorithms optimized to
run over both indexed and unstructured data, suitable
for general purpose SQL databases.
• The design of ObliDB, an enclave-based oblivious
database engine that efficiently runs general relational
read workloads over multiple access methods.
• A lightweight query planner to choose between opera-
tor implementations offered by ObliDB.
• An implementation and evaluation of ObliDB using
Intel SGX.
2 Background and Security Goals
This section gives background on hardware enclaves, de-
scribes our threat model, and states our desired security
properties. The fundamental goal of ObliDB is to protect
both user data and query parameters from a malicious at-
tacker with full power to manipulate components of the sys-
tem lying outside a trusted hardware enclave. This includes
protection against both direct observation/modification of
data and indirect observation of access pattern leakage.
2.1 Background
A hardware enclave provides developers with the abstrac-
tion of a secure portion of the processor that can verifi-
ably run a trusted code base (TCB) and protect its limited
memory from a malicious or compromised OS [1, 26]. De-
velopers get a small memory region hidden from the OS
and cleared when execution enters or exits an enclave. In
this memory, the trusted code can keep secrets from an
untrusted OS that otherwise controls the machine. The
hardware handles the process of entering and exiting an
enclave and hiding the activity of the enclave while non-
enclave code runs. Enclave code may require access to
OS resources such as networking and I/O, so developers
specify an interface between the enclave and OS.
An enclave proves that it runs an untampered version of
the desired code through an attestation mechanism. Attes-
tation involves an enclave providing a signed hash of its
initial state (including the running code), which a client
compares with the expected value and rejects if there is
any evidence of a corrupted program.
2.2 Threat Model
We leverage a trusted hardware enclave to protect against
an attacker with full control of the operating system (OS).
We assume that our attacker has the power to examine and
modify untrusted memory, network communication, and
communication between the processor and enclave. More-
over, it can observe access patterns to untrusted memory
and maliciously interrupt the execution of an enclave. We
note that an OS-level attacker can always launch an indefi-
nite denial of service attack against an enclave, but such
an attack does not compromise privacy. We also allow our
attacker to use arbitrary auxiliary information about the
nature of data stored. For example, if a database is storing
patient data, this includes the incidence of various diseases
in the general population.
We assume the security of the trusted hardware platform
in that the enclave hides contents of its protected memory
pages and CPU registers from an attacker with control of
the OS and the attacker cannot subvert the remote attesta-
tion process by which the enclave proves its authenticity.
Power analysis and timing side channels are out of the
scope. Furthermore, we assume a secure channel exists
through which a user can send messages to the enclave:
for example, a client can establish such a connection to the
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enclave through TLS.
We implement our techniques on Intel’s SGX [26]
due to its popularity and widespread availability. Al-
though several side-channel attacks based on abusing
page faults, branching history, or speculative execution
have been demonstrated against SGX’s protected mem-
ory [18, 24, 44, 77, 80, 82], mitigations exist to handle
some of these attacks [62, 69–71], and other hardware
enclave designs avoid the pitfalls that leave SGX vulner-
able [27, 45, 48]. In particular, the RISC-V based Sanc-
tum [27] provides a developer abstraction similar to SGX
with minimal performance overhead.
Limited Oblivious Memory. We assume a limited
amount of oblivious memory is available to the enclave
and protected from access pattern leaks (as in Opaque [85],
to which we compare). That is, when the enclave makes
a memory access inside this region, the operating system
cannot determine which part was accessed. We note that
SGX does not provide this kind of obliviousness. However,
other similar enclave designs such as Sanctum or RISC-V’s
Keystone do provide it with little additional overhead, and
the principles of the ObliDB system can run just as well
on any other enclave architecture. Moreover, many of our
oblivious operators, including the query planner, all SE-
LECT algorithms except the “Small” algorithm, and one
of our JOIN algorithms, maintain obliviousness even with
an enclave completely vulnerable to these attacks, i.e. with
0MB of oblivious memory. The quantity of oblivious mem-
ory can be set as small as a few megabytes. It primarily
serves to store the root position map for our ORAM imple-
mentation, and is also used to improve performance for the
aggregation, grouped aggregation, and join operators (Sec-
tion 4) and hide accesses to code pages. The amount of
oblivious memory can be reduced at the cost of decreased
performance, but we evaluate using 20MB or less in all our
experiments. We will discuss the oblivious memory costs
of each of our data structures and algorithms as we present
them. We show how changes in the oblivious memory
budget affect a more complex query in Section 7.1.
2.3 Our Guarantees
Our algorithms leak only the sizes of input, intermediate,
and result tables and the physical query plan chosen. This
security level is the same as Opaque’s oblivious mode [85]
and Cipherbase [4]. One of our SELECT algorithms also
leaks whether the rows returned by a query form a con-
tinuous segment of the table queried (e.g. as in a range
query), but this algorithm can be turned off if the leakage
is deemed too large and is not used in our performance
comparison to prior work. For situations where leaking
intermediate table sizes is unacceptable, ObliDB also has
a padding mode where all intermediate results are padded
to a chosen size and query optimization is not applied,
leaking nothing about queries but the logical plan and
the upper bound on result sizes (like Opaque’s padding
mode [85]). ObliDB can also be combined with more
sophisticated padding techniques, like [11], that provide
differential privacy instead of full obliviousness to reduce
the padding.
In general, whether the size of intermediate tables is
sensitive depends on the application. For example, in a
join of two tables where only one row is selected from
each table (say, a customer record and the customer’s lat-
est order), the sizes of those intermediate results do not
reveal much information; however, a query that selects
all of the customer’s orders (and then perhaps aggregates
them) would let an adversary know how many orders the
customer made. ObliDB includes a fused select + project
+ aggregate operator that can avoid leaking intermediate
result sizes even in some multi-operator queries by com-
bining these operations into a single, oblivious operator.
Similar to leaking intermediate result sizes, leaking a
query plan can reveal information about the structure of
queries, e.g. whether an INSERT or JOIN query was exe-
cuted, and whether an index was used. However, ObliDB
hides query parameters such as which key in an index was
requested. For example, by observing the physical plans
used, an attacker could learn that a query performed a point
lookup on an index, but not which key was requested, or
whether the same key is requested again later. Likewise,
ObliDB’s query planner chooses between different imple-
mentations of selection and join operators based on the
number of matching records, but the attacker does not learn
which specific records were chosen (Section 5). In general,
there is a fundamental tradeoff between information leak-
age and performance: if users want some queries to run
faster than others, or to send back a smaller result set, an
observer will learn that such a query was executed. How-
ever, in practice, hiding which data was accessed disables
many access pattern attacks.
Finally, data at rest outside the enclave is encrypted
and MACed, and leaks only its size. In both the padding
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Hardware Enclave
Metadata Oblivious Operators
Encryption 
Keys
Untrusted OS
Untrusted Storage
Table 1
(Indexed)
Table 2
(Linear)
Table 3
(Linear+Indexed)
Figure 1: ObliDB runs in a hardware enclave and stores en-
crypted tables in untrusted memory accessed through the OS. It
can store tables using either an oblivious B+ tree index, a flat
array, or both.
Method Flat Index Both
Space N ∼ 4N ∼ 5N
Point Read O(N) O(log2N) O(log2N)
Large Read O(N) O(N) O(N)
Insert O(1) O(log2N) O(log2N)
Update O(N) O(log2N) O(N)
Delete O(N) O(log2N) O(N)
Figure 2: Asymptotic performance of storage methods. Fast
inserts on flat storage and large reads on indexed storage achieve
better than expected asymptotics due to optimizations in Sec-
tion 3.
and no-padding modes, we do not hide the number of
tables in a database or which table(s) a query accesses.
Beyond hiding data values and access patterns, we make
the integrity guarantee that ObliDB catches any tampering
with data by the malicious OS. We use a series of checks to
protect against arbitrary tampering within rows of a table,
addition/removal of rows, shuffling of table contents, or
rollbacks to a previous system state.
Appendix A presents a formalization of our security
guarantees. We provide security arguments for the oblivi-
ousness of each storage method and operator as they appear
in the text.
3 ObliDB Architecture and Data Structures
Architecture overview. Figure 1 shows an overview of
the ObliDB architecture. ObliDB consists of a trusted code
base inside an enclave that provides an interface for users
to create, modify, and query tables using our oblivious
query processing algorithms, which we describe in Sec-
tion 4. ObliDB stores tables, authenticated and encrypted,
in unprotected memory and obliviously accesses them as
needed by the various supported operators. The encryp-
tion key for data stored in unprotected memory always
resides inside the enclave, encrypting/decrypting blocks of
data as they are written or read from unprotected memory.
ObliDB can store data via two methods: flat and indexed.
The indexed method consists of an ORAM with a B+ tree
stored inside, whereas the flat method requires scanning
the whole table on each query to ensure obliviousness.
ObliDB supports oblivious versions of the operators
SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, GROUP BY and
JOIN as well as the aggregates COUNT, SUM, MIN, MAX,
and AVG. It also includes a query planner that chooses
between operator implementations for selection and join
queries, which we describe in Section 5.
Since the core contribution of ObliDB lies in its obliv-
ious query processing algorithms, it does not currently
include support for transactions, but support for concur-
rency and logging can be added on top of the current
operators. For example, a standard write-ahead log could
be generically added to the system. Appends to such a log
would not leak any additional information or affect obliv-
iousness, as the only change would be to make a write
to an encrypted log file before each insert/update/delete
operation. Concurrent access to ORAM data structures
could be facilitated by using an ORAM construction that
supports parallel access [17, 21–23, 28, 53].
ObliDB can store data via two methods – flat and in-
dexed – or combine both. We currently let system admin-
istrators decide which storage method(s) to use for each
table based on the expected workload. Section 3.3 dis-
cusses costs and benefits of choosing either or both storage
methods. ObliDB creates tables with an initial maximum
capacity that can be increased later by copying to a new,
larger table. We divide data into blocks of a configurable
size2. Our current implementation assumes records are of
fixed length and also stores a boolean flag with each record
indicating whether it is in use.
Although encryption and oblivious data struc-
tures/algorithms ensure the privacy of data in ObliDB,
additional protections stop an attacker from tampering
with data. ObliDB MACs and encrypts every block stored
2In our current implementation, data in leaves and flat storage are
fixed to one record per block.
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outside the enclave, preventing the OS from modifying or
adding new rows to tables. Each block of MACed data
includes a record of which row(s) the block contains and a
current “revision number” for that block, a copy of which
ObliDB also stores inside the enclave. Each time a block
is modified, we increment the block’s revision number.
Any attempt to duplicate, shuffle, or remove rows within a
data structure will be caught when an operator discovers
that the row number of data it has requested does not
exist or does not correspond to that which it has received.
Rollbacks of system state are caught when the revision
numbers of blocks do not match the last revision numbers
for those blocks recorded in the enclave. Rollbacks on
encrypted enclave data sealed to disk can be prevented
either by storing revision numbers with the client or using
an enclave rollback protection system like ROTE [49].
3.1 Flat Storage Method
The flat storage method simply stores rows in a series
of adjacent blocks with no built-in mechanism to ensure
obliviousness of memory accesses, so every read or write
to the table must involve accesses to every block to hide
access patterns. As such, operators acting on these ta-
bles, as will be seen in Section 4, involve a series of scans
over the entire table. This performs best with small tables,
tables where operations will typically require returning
large swaths of the table, or analytics that involve reading
most or all of the table regardless of the need for oblivi-
ousness. The challenge in designing algorithms for this
storage method lies in using the limited space of the en-
clave effectively to reduce the number of scans and data
processing operations involved in each operator.
Insertions, updates, and deletions on flat tables involve
one pass over the table, during which unaffected blocks
receive a dummy write (overwriting a row with the data it
already held, re-encrypted and therefore re-randomized).
For insertions, the first unused block encountered receives
a real write. For updates or deletion, any row matching the
specified criteria will be updated or marked unused and
overwritten with dummy data, respectively. All of these
operations leak nothing about the parameters to the query
being executed or the data being operated on except the
sizes of the data structures involved because they consist
of one scan over a table where each encrypted block is
read and then written with a fresh encryption.
In tables with few deletions, an administrator can choose
an alternative, constant-time insertion algorithm that saves
the index of the last row where an insert occurred and
always inserts directly into the next block in memory, skip-
ping the scan. This insertion leaks no additional informa-
tion beyond the sizes of tables because the access pattern
of the insert does not depend on the content of the data
except on the number of insertions made, which our ad-
versary can already learn by observing the sizes of tables
over time. Since every entry in a table is encrypted, an
adversary will not be able to tell if later operations modify
or even remove the inserted data, despite knowing ahead
of time where each new record will be placed.
3.2 Indexed Storage Method
Standard insertion and deletion operations for B+ trees,
even when combined with ORAM, leak information about
the tree’s internal structure, compromising obliviousness
by splitting or merging nodes when they reach fixed thresh-
old numbers of children. We ensure obliviousness by
padding all insertions and deletions with additional dummy
ORAM accesses until the number of accesses matches the
worst-case number for the respective operation. The prop-
erty of B+ trees that all data resides in the leaves of the
tree means that any lookup already accesses the same num-
ber of nodes, so no modification is required for this case.
Once each operation involves a fixed number of accesses
to memory, we can leverage ORAM’s security to guar-
antee obliviousness. We use the ORAM interface as a
black box, so the details of the underlying ORAM can be
omitted except to state that our choice of the Path ORAM
scheme [74] incurs an O(logN) overhead for each access
to memory. See Appendix B for details on the construction
and formal guarantees of this scheme. We use a separate
ORAM for each table because we already leak which table
queries access, and using multiple smaller ORAMs is more
computationally efficient than using a single monolithic
one.
Two optimizations dramatically improve the perfor-
mance of our oblivious B+ trees. First, our implementation
operates on a “lazy write back” principle, only writing to
the ORAM when necessary and otherwise keeping nodes
in the enclave until they are no longer needed. Second,
we remove all parent pointers from our implementation.
Normal B+ tree implementations often have pointers in
each node to quickly find its parent (e.g. [8]). However,
each time a tree splits or merges a node, all the children
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Algorithm Time Complexity Obliv. Mem. Summary
Small Select O(N2/S) S Bytes Fast when data almost fits in enclave: scan table once per
enclave-full of data
Large Select O(N) 0 Bytes Fast when almost entire table selected: copy table and clear
unselected rows
Cont. Select O(N) 0 Bytes Fast when continuous segment of table selected: write to
output table for each row of input table, wrapping around at
the end, making dummy writes unless row is to be selected
Hash Select O(N · C) 0 Bytes Use if other strategies don’t apply: hash selected rows to
location in output table
Naı¨ve Select O(N logN) O(R) Bytes Used only as baseline: ORAM operation for each row of
table
Aggregate O(N) 0 Bytes Scan table, compute aggregate in one pass
Gp. Aggregate O(N) O(R) Bytes Store groups in hash table in oblivious memory and, for each
row, check if there is a matching group in the table or add a
new group to the table.
Hash Join O(N
S
·M) S Bytes Block by block, make hash table from one table and see
if rows of second table hash to same places – variant of
standard hash join algorithm
Opaque Join O((N +M) log2(N+M
S
)) S Bytes Sort tables by join column (use quicksort in obliv. mem. to
accelerate), then linear scan to merge blocks of rows.
0-OM Join O((N +M) log2(N +M)) 0 Bytes Bitonic sort tables by join column, then linear scan to merge
matching rows
Figure 3: Oblivious physical operators. N and M are table sizes (in number of rows), C the max chain length of the hash table, S is
the total available oblivious memory, and R the number of rows in the output of a query. Selection over indexes incurs an additional
multiplicative factor of O(log2N) in time complexity but runs over the smaller range of rows returned by the index instead of a
whole table. Each indexed table requires 8N Bytes of oblivious memory to store and access obliviously.
of nodes involved need to have their parent pointers up-
dated, a very slow process in the regime where every node
requires an ORAM write to update.
If the cost of maintaining both indexed and flat repre-
sentations of data is too high, e.g. storage is limited or
tables are very frequently updated, the indexed storage
data structure can also be scanned linearly as a table us-
ing the flat method would be, ignoring the index structure.
Our algorithms can treat both internal tree nodes and extra
ORAM blocks as dummy blocks with no security conse-
quences. This scan has additional overhead over directly
using the flat storage method because of the extra space
required by ORAM and the index structure, but in practice
this overhead is less than 2.5×.
3.3 Complexity Analysis
Figure 2 compares the asymptotic operations of standard
read, insertion, and deletion operations as well as space
overhead for each table type. The indexed method per-
forms best on small reads that access one or a few rows
of a table, whereas queries which expect to return large
segments of a table should use the flat method, which
performs faster than a linear scan over the contents of an
index despite equal asymptotic runtimes. Using both stor-
age methods, while incurring the cost of both for insertions
and deletions, proves effective when queries of diverse se-
lectivities run on the same data. We empirically measure
these tradeoffs in Section 7.2. In terms of storage overhead,
our oblivious indexes inherit the 4× storage overhead re-
quired by the Path ORAM [74] we use and each encrypted
block is slightly larger than a plaintext block (as is al-
ways the case with authenticated encryption). All other
sources of storage overhead, e.g. that required for data
integrity measures, only add a few bytes to each block of
data, amounting to less than 1% additional overhead. Path
ORAM contains a data structure that we need to store in
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oblivious memory at a cost of 8 Bytes of memory per row
of an indexed table. We can reduce the oblivious memory
required by using a recursive ORAM as described in Ap-
pendix B or remove it completely via a doubly-oblivious
ORAM as described by Oblix [50] or ZeroTrace [67].
4 Oblivious Query Processing
The key to executing queries in ObliDB is a set of new
oblivious query processing algorithms that can efficiently
run queries over either flat or indexed storage. This section
describes our oblivious query processing algorithms for a
large subset of SQL, including selection with conditions
composed of arbitrary logical combinations of equality or
range queries, joins, aggregates (count, sum, max, min,
average), and grouped aggregation. In cases where the
storage method used for a table admits multiple algorithms
to satisfy a given query, ObliDB’s query planner chooses
the algorithm that maximizes performance. At a high level,
the planner makes a quick preliminary scan of the table
being queried and uses known information about input
and output table sizes to make an optimization decision
without leaking more information about the query or data.
Details on the query planner appear in Section 5.
We will begin by discussing the algorithms in the con-
text of flat storage and then discuss the modifications
needed for compatibility with indexes, if any. Each opera-
tion is accompanied by a security argument. Since stored
rows do not persist inside the enclave between queries,
there is no opportunity for a caching side channel based on
which rows can be retrieved faster in a subsequent query.
Thus the whole engine runs obliviously so long as each of
the operators is individually oblivious.
Whenever we refer to rows of a table being read or
written without explicitly stating where they are stored,
it is implied that the data resides in unprotected memory,
is decrypted before being read inside the enclave, and is
re-encrypted before being written back outside. Figure 3
summarizes our algorithms and their complexity. We eval-
uate the performance of our operators in Section 7.
We refer to the subject of a query as table T and the
results as table R. We leak only the sizes of T and R.
In the following, the enclave learns the size of R from
the query planner before executing the operator, allowing
output data structures of the appropriate size to be allocated
before scanning the data needed to fill them.
4.1 Oblivious Selection Queries
Selection queries involve choosing elements
from a table that match a given predicate (e.g.
date>’2018-09-01’). One natural way to im-
plement a SELECT operator would be to sequentially read
each record in the targeted table and write out the row if it
should be selected. Despite touching each row in the table
once, this implementation does not provide obliviousness.
An adversary observing the pattern of accesses to the input
and output tables would know whether a row is written to
the output after each read: both tables are accessed each
time a row is selected, but only the input table is accessed
when the a row is not selected. For example, consider a
table Checkins that logs when employees enter or exit
an office building. An attacker observing access patterns
on the query SELECT * FROM Checkins WHERE
uid=3172 AND date>’2018-01-01’ could infer
from the chosen rows when the user had entered the
building or (without seeing the query) what dates the
query targets.
To defend against this and other subtle attacks, includ-
ing those based on prior knowledge of the data distribu-
tion, ObliDB provides the following oblivious SELECT
algorithms (summarized with their complexities in Fig-
ures 3, 4, and 5). In each algorithm, ObliDB has access to
the output table size |R| based on information provided by
the query planner during its initial scan of the data.
Naı¨ve. included as a baseline, the naı¨ve oblivious algo-
rithm is a direct translation of a non-oblivious SELECT to
an oblivious one via ORAM. After examining each row,
it executes an ORAM operation. If the row is included in
the output, it makes a write. If not, it makes a dummy read
to an arbitrary block. There must be an ORAM operation
after reading each row or else an adversary would know
that any row which did not coincide with an ORAM op-
eration was not included in the output. After completing
the scan of the input table, it copies the contents of the
ORAM to the flat storage format and returns it. This al-
gorithm requires 4|R| Bytes of oblivious memory to store
the ORAM it uses to build the output table.
Our techniques to improve on this baseline involve find-
ing the right balance between using data structures in the
enclave to remove the need for an ORAM and making
multiple fast, oblivious passes over data. These ideas con-
stitute the guiding principle in designing our remaining
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Figure 4: Small, Large, and Continuous SELECT algorithms.
The enclave in this example is only large enough to store two
rows of data, so the Small (A) algorithm, which scans the table
once per enclave-full of data, takes three passes to complete.
The Large (B) and Continuous (C) algorithms always make only
one pass. The Large algorithm copies the input table and clears
unselected rows, and the Continuous algorithm writes to the
output table for each row of the input table, wrapping around at
the end, making dummy writes for rows that are not selected.
SELECT algorithms and choosing between them.
Small. In the case where all the rows of table R only
require a few times the space available in the enclave,
a selection strategy that makes multiple fast passes over
the data proves effective. We take multiple passes over
table T , each time storing any selected rows into a buffer
in the enclave’s oblivious memory and keeping track of
the index of the last checked row. Each time the buffer
fills, its contents are written to R after that pass over T .
Although this strategy could result in a number of passes
linear in the size of R, it is effective for small tables. Since
it requires oblivious memory to store rows in the enclave,
this algorithm uses whatever quantity of oblivious memory
is made available to it. However, reducing the amount
of oblivious memory does not affect correctness, only
performance. This algorithm is depicted in Figure 4A.
This algorithm leaks only the sizes of tables T and R
because every pass over the data consists of one read to
each row and the number of passes reveals only how many
times the output set will fill the enclave, a number that can
be calculated from the size of R.
Large. If table R contains almost every row of table T ,
we create R as a copy of T and then make one pass over
R where each unselected row is marked unused and each
selected row receives a dummy write. Obliviousness holds
because the copy operation does not depend on the data
copied and we clear unselected rows with a read followed
by a write to each block of the table, revealing only the
size of T . This algorithm, shown in Figure 4B, uses no
oblivious memory.
Continuous. Should the rows selected form one continu-
ous section of the data stored in the table, ObliDB requires
only one pass over the table, as shown in Figure 4C. Such
a situation can arise when range queries are made over
sorted data such as names, dates, ID numbers, etc, or re-
trieved in the same order they were inserted. To handle
such queries, ObliDB first creates table R. Then, for the
ith row in table T , if that row should be in the output, it
writes the row to position i mod |R| of R. If not, it makes
a dummy write. Since the rows that need to be included in
R make up one continuous segment of T , this procedure
results in exactly the selected rows appearing in R. This
algorithm uses no oblivious memory.
In addition to the sizes of tables T and R, the fact that
ObliDB chooses this algorithm over one of the other op-
tions leaks that the result is drawn from a continuous set
of rows in the table. In these cases, however, knowing that
users are selecting a range is often not so sensitive as what
that range is, which we do hide. Users concerned about
this additional leakage could disable this option and use
one of the other options with no reduction in supported
functionality. The execution of the algorithm itself is obliv-
ious because the memory access pattern is fixed: at each
step, the algorithm reads the next row of T and then writes
to the next row of R.
Hash. If none of the preceding special-case algorithms
apply, ObliDB uses a hashing solution illustrated in Fig-
ure 5. For the ith row in T , if the row is to be included in
the output, we write the content of the row to the h(i)th
position in R, for some hash function h. Otherwise, we
make a dummy write to the h(i)th position in R. Since the
hash is on the index of the row in the data structure and
not over the actual contents of a row, information about
the data cannot be leaked by access patterns when rows are
written to R, and the algorithm uses no oblivious memory.
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Figure 5: Hash SELECT algorithm. Left: The access pattern
for any input and output table sizes is fixed because the hash of
the block number is taken, not of the data itself. Right: a sample
execution of the algorithm. Each input cell is read followed by
either a dummy or real write following the arrows to the right.
Our actual implementation uses double hashing in addition to the
chaining shown.
The algorithm above needs a couple changes to ensure
that we properly handle collisions while maintaining obliv-
iousness. We can use standard techniques to resolve col-
lisions, but in order to maintain obliviousness, every row
of T must make the same accesses to memory regardless
of whether it is included in R. We handle this by having
every write make as many memory accesses as in the case
of the worst expected chain of collisions, regardless of
whether the row under consideration in T actually appears
in R. Following the guidance of Azar et al. [9] to get small
probability of failure, we use double hashing and have
a fixed-depth list of 5 slots for each position in R. This
means that for each block in T , there will be 10 accesses
to R, 5 for each of the two hash functions.
The modifications above ensure that data access patterns
are fixed regardless of the data in the table and which rows
the query selects. As mentioned above, since we hash the
index of the row in the data structure and not the actual
contents of a row, information about the data itself cannot
be leaked by access patterns when rows are written to R.
As such, we leak only the sizes of T and R.
Selection over Indexes. Selection over the indexed stor-
age method works identically to flat storage except that
the linear scan begins inside an ORAM at a point spec-
ified by an index lookup. If the rows returned by a
query are not continuous, the leakage also includes the
size of the segment of the database scanned in the index.
For example, supposing that there is one student named
Fred in a table of students indexed by student IDs, the
query SELECT * FROM students WHERE NAME
= ‘‘Fred’’ AND ID > 50 and ID < 60 leaks
that 9 rows were scanned in the execution of the query.
We consider this leakage to be included in the sizes of
intermediate tables, as this query is equivalent to a query
plan which selects a continuous segment from an index and
then selects a noncontinuous segment from the returned
table. Padding can hide this leakage. The Large algorithm
is not used in the indexed storage method because indexes
are meant for queries that request a small fraction of a ta-
ble, not almost all of it. In terms of complexity, algorithms
running over the index have the same complexity as their
flat counterparts in Figure 3, but each algorithm incurs a
log2 |T | multiplicative overhead due to use of the index
structure for reads. On the other hand, the actual query
runs on table T ′, the range of rows returned from the query
to the index, instead of the full table T .
Example. Consider the following queries on a flat table:
SELECT * FROM Checkins WHERE date=’2018-08-14’
SELECT * FROM Checkins WHERE date>’1900-01-01’
When ObliDB receives such queries, it first runs the query
planner, which determines which algorithm will perform
best for the given query. Since the first query requests
rows from a specific date, there will only be a handful of
entries, so it chooses the Small algorithm. On the other
hand, the second query likely predates the construction
of the building and will therefore select every row of the
table. The planner will choose the Large algorithm for this
query.
For query 1, ObliDB will scan the table, storing any
records from the chosen date inside the enclave until the
end of the scan. Then it will write all the matching rows to
an output table at once. If the enclave fills before reaching
the end of the table, ObliDB will finish the scan without
storing any more records and then conduct a second scan
that begins storing records in the enclave where the first
left off. For query 2, ObliDB copies the table to create an
identical output table and then makes a scan of the copy
to delete any rows from before the year 1900. If the above
queries were part of a larger query or if the user decided
to make a subsequent query on the output, ObliDB would
then use the output of these queries as the input to the next
query and run the appropriate operator.
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4.2 Oblivious Aggregate & Group By Queries
An aggregate over a subset or entirety of a table requires
only one pass over the table where we calculate the aggre-
gate cumulatively based on the data in each row in O(|T |)
time. We keep the aggregate statistic inside the enclave.
Since the memory access pattern of this operation always
involves sequential reads of each block in the table fol-
lowed by an update to the aggregate statistic, nothing leaks
beyond the size of table T and no oblivious memory is
needed.
We handle grouped aggregation similarly, except an ar-
ray in the enclave keeps track of aggregates for each group.
Since we need to hide which group’s aggregate each row
modifies, we require 4 Bytes of oblivious memory to store
the aggregate for each group. We use a hash bucketing
approach where each group’s value is hashed and inserted
into a hash table in the enclave. Each row scanned is
hashed and checked against the hash table. If there is a
match, then the row under examination corresponds to a
known group referenced in the table, and if not, then the
current row is added to the hash table as a new group. This
method results in running time O(|T |). If the number of
groups becomes so large that the hash table cannot fit in
oblivious memory (a situation that did not arise in any of
our experiments, as each additional group requires very
little space), we could switch to using the sort-and-filter
approach introduced by Opaque [85] which runs in time
O(|T | log2 |T |).
Combining Aggregation and Selection. In order to im-
prove performance and avoid leaking intermediate table
sizes for common queries that combine selection, aggre-
gation, and grouped aggregation, ObliDB provides a com-
bined select/group/aggregate implementation. The SE-
LECT algorithms described above require multiple passes
over a table in order to provide obliviousness, but if the
next query only takes an aggregate, the obliviously pro-
duced intermediate table can immediately be discarded,
wasting all the effort of creating it. We remove this inef-
ficiency by computing aggregates directly over the input
table while filtering it for the selection criteria. Since se-
lected rows don’t need to be written anywhere, we skip the
extra effort required by general-purpose oblivious selec-
tion.
4.3 Oblivious Join Queries
Arasu and Kaushik [5] and Opaque [85] previously intro-
duced oblivious join algorithms that are also applicable
to ObliDB. We support Opaque’s join algorithm as well
as two additional algorithms: an oblivious hash join and
a variant of the Opaque join that requires no oblivious
memory.
Oblivious Hash Join. We implement a variant of the stan-
dard hash join algorithm [32]. We refer to the two tables
being joined as T1 and T2. We make a hash table out of as
many rows of T1 as will fit in the enclave and then hash
the variable to be joined from each row of T2 to check for
matches. This process repeats until reaching the end of T1
. After each check, a row is written to the next block of an
output table. If there is a match, the joined row is written.
If not, a dummy row is written to the table at that position.
Since each comparison between the tables always results
in one write to the next block of the output structure, the
memory access pattern of this algorithm is oblivious. Like
the traditional join algorithm of the same name, the com-
plexity of our oblivious hash join is O(|T1| · |T2|). Since
it needs oblivious memory to store the hash table, this
algorithm uses whatever quantity of oblivious memory is
made available to it. However, as with the Small selection
algorithm, reducing the amount of oblivious memory does
not affect correctness, only performance. A side effect of
this algorithm’s obliviousness is that the size of the output
table data structure will always be |T1| · |T2|. Our remain-
ing join algorithms focus on the case of foreign key joins
where the maximum output size is at most the greater of
|T1| and |T2|.
Oblivious Sort-Merge Join. We support two sort-merge
join algorithms for foreign key joins. First, we re-
implement the Opaque join. This algorithm begins by
putting the contents of both tables into one new table. Then
it uses quicksort to sort chunks of the data that fit inside an
enclave’s oblivious memory and merges the chunks with a
bitonic sorting network. Finally, one linear scan down the
new sorted table eliminates rows that do not have matches
and merges matching rows to form the output table. In
addition to requiring oblivious memory, using quicksort
to accelerate the join may open timing side channels as
well, a factor that must be considered in choosing a join
algorithm for a particular application.
Next, we support a variant of the Opaque join that re-
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quires no oblivious memory and operates by running a
bitonic sort over the rows of both tables according to the
join criteria without quicksorting chunks inside of obliv-
ious memory first. The bitonic sort can be implemented
obliviously because it always makes the same set of com-
parisons independent of the data being sorted. As an opti-
mization, when the size of the recursive sort becomes small
enough to fit inside of the enclave, we carry out the sort in-
side the enclave to avoid paying the cost of calls to memory
outside the enclave. This has no impact on obliviousness
but speeds up memory access by reducing communication
between the enclave and untrusted memory while sorting.
We call this the 0-OM join.
We compare the performance of our join algorithms in
Section 7 and state their complexities in Figure 3. We
could reduce the O(log2 n) terms in the oblivious sorts to
O(log n) using a randomized shellsort [38] (as discussed
by Arasu and Kaushik [5]) at the cost of making the cor-
rectness of the sorting algorithm probabilistic.
5 Query Planner
Our query planner picks which selection and join algo-
rithms to use based on statistical information on the input
and output table sizes. Our main insight is that we can
use the information already leaked by the data structures
and output sizes in ObliDB to minimize additional leak-
age from query planning. In Section 7.2, we find that the
planner can improve query performance by 4.6-11×. The
query planner is not used in padding mode, where we hide
output sizes.
ObliDB runs the query planner at runtime whenever it
encounters a selection or join operator. For each selection,
the planner begins with a fast scan over the data, during
which it keeps track of (1) the number of rows satisfying
the predicate and (2) whether those rows are adjacent in the
input table. The enclave saves the computed output size
to pass into selection operators that pre-allocate output
storage. Based on the ratios of number of output rows
to available oblivious memory and input table size, the
planner decides which variant of the selection operator to
use. A precomputed set of thresholds decide when to run
each operator. For maximum flexibility, users can also
manually choose to force a particular operator.
Note that we cannot simply return the query result in
the first scan over the data, as a naı¨ve one-pass algorithm
would violate obliviousness. Instead, we must run one of
our oblivious operators. Since many of these operators
need to know the size of the output table up-front (to
allocate memory for the results), the planner’s first scan to
compute statistics is often “for free.”
We adopt a similar approach to choose the appropriate
algorithm for foreign key joins, but planning for joins
requires even less information than selection. Observe
that all the join algorithms in Section 4.3 generate output
tables and do computation of the maximum possible size
given the input table sizes. As such, the output table,
although it may contain many dummy rows that are marked
as unused, will reside in a data structure whose size can
be calculated directly from the sizes of the input tables.
Moreover, this property means that the performance of
the join algorithms will depend only on the input table
sizes and will otherwise be the same regardless of the
selectivity of the join. These properties taken together
allow us to make effective optimization decisions based
only on knowledge of the sizes of the tables joined and the
amount of oblivious memory available inside the enclave.
Similar to selection, we pick which join algorithm to use
based on the ratio of the available oblivious memory to
the size of the first input table. If the amount of oblivious
memory is large relative to the size of the first table, we
always use the hash join. Otherwise, we plug in the table
sizes and amount of oblivious memory into expressions
denoting the asymptotic runtimes of the join algorithms
and choose the smaller result. Section 7.2 shows that this
approach works well in practice.
Security. Performance improvements due to query plan-
ning intrinsically require leakage because the benefits of
planning arise from the fact that different algorithms per-
form better for different data and queries. Our choice of
physical operator reveals two pieces of information. First,
for selection, is the number of matching rows. Since the
non-padded execution mode already reveals the output size
of the result, this adds nothing to the overall leakage of
the system. Second is whether or not the rows returned by
a query form a continuous segment of the table queried.
This is revealed by the choice of the Continuous algorithm
from Section 4, which occurs if the rows to be returned
are continuous. The Continuous algorithm can optionally
be disabled, causing optimization to leak no additional in-
formation beyond what is already revealed through output
sizes (this is the configuration used for our comparison to
prior work in Section 7). Planning for joins leaks even less,
12
Table Name Rows Notes
USERVISITS 350,000 Server logs for many sites.
Data from the Big Data Bench-
mark [3].
RANKINGS 360,000 URLs, PageRanks, and average
visit durations for many sites.
Data from the Big Data Bench-
mark [3].
Figure 6: Data sets used in the Big Data Benchmark [3].
as it relies only on the sizes of the tables being joined and
the oblivious memory available.
Our query planner always has the same memory access
pattern for selection queries: read each row, update statis-
tics, and perform a table lookup to select an algorithm at
the end. As such, the only leakage introduced by the query
planner comes from its final choice of which physical op-
erator to run, not the optimization algorithm itself. For
joins, the planner only reads the recorded sizes of the input
tables and makes no other memory accesses.
6 Implementation
We implemented ObliDB on Intel SGX [26], including
the storage methods from Section 3 as well as the oblivi-
ous operator algorithms and query planner of Sections 4
and 5. Our implementation consists of over 14,000 lines
of code and builds upon the Remote Attestation sample
code provided with the SGX SDK [1] and the B+ tree
implementation of [8], the latter of which was heavily
edited in order to support our ORAM memory allocator.
We use SGX SDK libraries for encryption, MACs, and
hashing. We instantiate our ORAM scheme with a non-
recursive Path ORAM [74]. See Appendix B for details
on this scheme and the oblivious storage and performance
implications of recursive vs nonrecursive Path ORAM.
Our current implementation consists only of the core
database engine and lacks some components of a full-
featured DBMS, e.g. transaction management and persis-
tence to disk. In our evaluation, we compare ObliDB only
to in-memory tables on other oblivious systems to avoid
giving it an unfair advantage. It would be straightforward
to replace ObliDB’s external memory with disk storage, as
accesses to both ORAM and flat tables are already block-
oriented. We discuss options for supporting transactions
in Section 3.
7 Evaluation
We evaluate ObliDB on multiple datasets, comparing to
prior private database systems and widely used non-private
systems. We use a subset of the data available from the
Big Data Benchmark [3], shown in Figure 6, as well as
larger synthetic data. In addition, we measure the overhead
of ObliDB’s padding mode, demonstrate the effectiveness
of ObliDB’s query planner, study the impact of the cho-
sen storage methods, and examine tradeoffs in join algo-
rithms through a series of microbenchmarks. We evaluated
ObliDB on an Intel Core i7-6700 CPU @3.4GHz with
8GB of RAM running Ubuntu 16.04 and the SGX SDK
version 1.9. The comparison of join algorithms was done
on the same machine running Ubuntu 18.04 and the SGX
SDK version 2.5.
We find that ObliDB can leverage its indexes to achieve
order of magnitude performance improvements over pre-
vious private database systems. In particular, ObliDB
matches Opaque [85] for scan-based queries on flat ta-
bles but can outperform it by 19× when using an index.
ObliDB also performs over 7× faster than HIRB [64], an
oblivious map scheme, and comes within a factor of 2.6×
the performance of the non-private Spark SQL system.
7.1 Comparison to Prior Work
Comparison to Opaque. Figure 7 compares ObliDB with
Opaque’s oblivious mode [84, 85] and Spark SQL [7],
which provides no security guarantees, on queries 1-3 of
the Big Data Benchmark [3] on tables of 360,000 and
350,000 rows. We use the same queries and parameters
used by Opaque: 1000, 8, and 1980-04-01 are the param-
eters used for queries 1-3 of the benchmark, respectively.
Query 1 targets straightforward selection, Query 2 tests
grouped aggregation, and Query 3 tests joins. Opaque also
uses an SGX enclave and can be configured in either “en-
cryption” mode or “oblivious” mode, which hides access
patterns to data, but by means different from ours. We
compare to Opaque’s oblivious mode and run it in single
node configuration. We limit oblivious memory to 72MB
for Opaque (as in its original evaluation) and 20MB for
ObliDB, but neither system needed the full oblivious mem-
ory allowed. To compare fairly in terms of the leakage
permitted, we disable Continuous selection algorithm in
the comparison with Opaque.
We began by configuring ObliDB to use only the flat
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Figure 7: ObliDB outperforms Opaque Oblivious [85] by 1.1-19× and never runs
more than 2.6× slower than Spark SQL [7] on Queries Q1-Q3 of the Big Data
Benchmark [3]. Even without use of an index, ObliDB performs comparably to
Opaque Oblivious.
Figure 8: Performance of ObliDB and
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Figure 9: ObliDB’s oblivious indexes outperform the HIRB tree + vORAM oblivious map construction.
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Figure 10: Comparison of flat and indexed versions of operators over 100,000 rows of synthetic data. Flat scans do better when
more data needs to be accessed, but the indexed storage method performs far better for small queries.
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storage method, as Opaque does, and found that ObliDB
performs comparably to Opaque, slightly worse on query
1 and slightly better on queries 2 and 3. Next, we used
the combined storage method. An oblivious index allows
ObliDB to outperform Opaque by 19× on query 1 since
this query scans a small part of a table whereas Opaque
and spark SQL, which primarily handle analytic workloads,
scan the entire table. Indexes do not provide a speedup
on queries 2 and 3 which scan most of the input anyway.
ObliDB is only 2.4× and 2.6× slower than Spark SQL on
queries 2 and 3.
We also tested scan-based queries against our indexes
to see how ObliDB performs on frequently-updated data
too expensive to maintain in flat storage. These queries
performed about 2× slower than on flat tables. Thus, un-
like prior, flat-only systems, ObliDB performs analytics
relatively quickly on “live” tables frequently updated with
point insertions and deletions.
Impact of Oblivious Memory Budget. Figure 8 shows
the performance of ObliDB and Opaque’s oblivious mode
on query 3 of the Big Data Benchmark as the quantity
of oblivious memory varies from 6MB to 20MB, beyond
which the performance of ObliDB remains steady. We
chose this query because its performance is most affected
by an increase in oblivious memory for both systems. Both
systems’ performance improves as we add more oblivious
memory, but Opaque improves gradually whereas ObliDB
decreases in steps as the amount of oblivious memory
makes the blocks of the nested loop join large enough to
reduce the overall number of scans of the second table
being joined. In total, the increase from 6MB oblivious
memory to 20MB results in a 1.77× speedup for ObliDB.
Comparison to HIRB. Next, we compare ObliDB’s per-
formance to The HIRB Tree + vORAM [64] secure index
structure. Unlike ObliDB, HIRB neither supports range
queries nor uses hardware enclaves. Source code for other
SGX-based oblivious indexes is not yet publicly available,
so we cannot compare to them directly, although reported
numbers for Oblix [50] and POSUP [41] appear to be
within several milliseconds of ours. Despite its reduced
functionality and differing security assumptions, HIRB
provides a good point of comparison as a practical system
attempting to solve similar problems. We compare against
it with a replication of the performance experiment in its
original paper.
Figure 9 compares the point query performance of
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Figure 13: Our query planner picks the best algorithm for
SELECT queries based on a first scan that determines which
oblivious operator to use. Bars omitted when an algorithm is not
applicable.
ObliDB’s oblivious indexes with a HIRB tree + vORAM
oblivious map [64] and MySQL. Although ObliDB does
not support transactions, we include comparisons of inser-
tion and deletion times over our indexes to demonstrate
the performance of the data structure (the comparison is
fair since HIRB also implements a key-value store with no
notion of concurrency or durability). We instantiated both
the table in ObliDB and the HIRB tree with 64-Byte data
entries and allocated the underlying vORAM with bucket
size 4096, a somewhat larger size than our own ORAM’s
buckets (HIRB performed worse on smaller bucket sizes).
On tables of 1,000,000 rows, ObliDB outperforms HIRB
by 7.6× in point selection and by 3× on insertions and
deletions. While still an order of magnitude slower than
MySQL for point queries on larger tables, network latency
from user to cloud can be tens of milliseconds, rendering
the difference insignificant.
The HIRB construction considers a “catastrophic at-
tack” scenario which compromises the system holding
the ORAM client, and they design the HIRB tree to pro-
vide history independence and secure deletion even under
this attack. Since our work relies on the security of the
hardware enclave and keeps the ORAM client inside the
enclave, the additional security properties desired by HIRB
come for free in our setting, explaining our improved per-
formance. Both our work and the HIRB tree make use
of padding for obliviousness, but each uses different opti-
mizations to minimize padding.
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Join Performance – 500 Rows Obliv. Mem.
Table 1 5,000 rows 10,000 rows
Table 2 Hash Opaque 0-OM Hash Opaque 0-OM
100 0.023s 0.205s 0.404s 0.047s 0.535s 1.017s
1,000 0.141s 0.259s 0.531s 0.274s 0.553s 1.092s
5,000 0.667s 0.529s 1.019s 1.289s 0.822s 1.585s
10,000 1.267s 0.808s 1.581s 2.592s 1.340s 2.497s
25,000 3.300s 2.078s 3.825s 6.540s 3.046s 5.337s
Join Performance – 7,500 Rows Obliv. Mem.
Table 1 5,000 rows 10,000 rows
Table 2 Hash Opaque 0-OM Hash Opaque 0-OM
100 0.007s 0.044s 0.202s 0.015s 0.154s 0.533s
1,000 0.016s 0.053s 0.244s 0.031s 0.165s 0.571s
5,000 0.050s 0.149s 0.520s 0.103s 0.335s 0.792s
10,000 0.095s 0.334s 0.794s 0.192s 0.431s 1.282s
25,000 0.241s 0.938s 2.041s 0.479s 1.040s 2.869s
Figure 14: Foreign key joins with tables and oblivious mem-
ory of varying sizes. The fastest and slowest algorithm in each
configuration are shown in blue and red, respectively. Reported
number is average of 5 runs, standard deviation is always less
than 8% of average. Our planner picks the fastest algorithm for
every entry in the table.
7.2 Microbenchmarks
Impact of storage method. Figure 10 compares our stor-
age methods on various queries. Flat scans perform better
when more rows are returned, but smaller queries per-
form much better with an index. Indexed DELETE and
UPDATE queries outperform flat ones, but the fast flat
INSERT query outperforms the indexed INSERT. The
flat storage method’s performance (outside of constant-
time insertions) degrades linearly in table size, but point
operations on indexes take polylogarithmic time. Figure 11
shows how point queries scale.
Often a combined table representation that maintains
both storage methods for the same data proves effective.
Although ObliDB pays insertion and deletion costs for
both methods, it can use the better representation for each
query, an important benefit because many real-world work-
loads rely heavily on different kinds of reads. Figure 12
shows ObliDB running various workloads with flat, in-
dexed, or both kinds of tables. One storage method alone
sometimes performs well, but a combined representation
often performs best.
Impact of query planner. Figure 13 shows ObliDB’s
choice of SELECT algorithms on queries that retrieve 5%
and 95% of a 100,000 row table. The “Hash” algorithm is
best asymptotically, but we pick an algorithm that performs
4.6-11× better in practice.
Join algorithm comparison. Figure 14 compares the per-
formance of ObliDB’s join algorithms on foreign key joins
for varying oblivious memory and table sizes. As ex-
plained in Section 5, input table sizes and oblivious mem-
ory are the only factors that affect join performance. Ac-
cess to larger amounts of oblivious memory is particularly
effective in speeding up the hash join algorithm because
the size of the oblivious memory determines how many
times chunks of the first table need to be made into hash
tables, which in turn determines the number of scans re-
quired of the second table. A large oblivious memory
results in a join whose running time is almost linear in
the size of the tables. For small oblivious memory, the
performance behaves as expected of standard hash and
sort-merge join algorithms: the hash join performs bet-
ter for small tables but rapidly becomes worse than the
sort-merge join as table sizes increase.
The Opaque join always outperforms the variant that
requires no oblivious memory because the two joins run
effectively the same overall algorithm, with the Opaque
join using oblivious memory to accelerate sorting. The
0-OM join gets faster as the amount of oblivious memory
increases because of our optimization that does oblivious
sorting inside the enclave when there is space available
without compromising obliviousness (to save on enclave
communication costs). As such, the algorithm gets faster
with more enclave memory, regardless of whether the mem-
ory is oblivious.
Impact of padding mode. Padding mode additionally
hides the sizes of tables, intermediate results, and final
outputs—comparable to the padding mode described but
not evaluated by Opaque [85]. We evaluate this mode
by running queries on the CFPB table of 107,000 rows
padded to 200,000 rows. Our aggregate query with the flat
storage method had a 4.4× slowdown and a select had a
2.4× slowdown. The larger slowdown for aggregates re-
sults from the padding algorithm padding to the maximum
supported number of groups for aggregates—in this case,
350,000. We did not evaluate padding mode for indexes as
the benefit of indexes arises from knowledge of the selec-
tivity of a query, the exact information padding hides. To
our knowledge, no comparable system has implemented
a pad mode, so we cannot compare to prior work. The
results do, however, represent reasonable slowdowns for
inflating a table’s size by approximately 2× with padding.
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8 Related Work
Encrypted Databases. Fuller et al. [35] summarize prior
work on cryptographically protected databases. The well-
known CryptDB [57] enables a tradeoff between secu-
rity and performance, encrypting fields differently accord-
ing to security needs. Arx [56] uses only strong encryp-
tion but leverages special data structures to allow search.
Other solutions, including Demertzis et al., Sophos, and
Diana [15, 16, 30], use searchable encryption. Although
all of these systems encrypt data, they can leak access
patterns [20, 42, 51, 83].
SGX Databases. StealthDB [39] is a legacy-compatible,
partially-oblivious database that does not provide integrity
or hide access patterns to indexes. VeritasDB [72] provides
integrity but not privacy. POSUP [41] uses ORAM and
SGX to search/update encrypted data and Cui et al. [29] use
SGX to speed up search over encrypted data, but both sup-
port a more limited range of functionalities than ObliDB.
More recently, Oblix [50] builds an oblivious index that
requires no obliviousness assumptions inside the enclave,
and Obladi [28] considers concurrent ACID transactions
but does not support indexes and only processes operations
in batches over discrete time epochs. Opaque [85] and
Cipherbase [4] support only analytics queries that scan all
the data, relying on oblivious sorts of an entire input table.
EnclaveDB [61] is an SGX-based DBMS that does
not hide access patterns. TrustedDB [10] uses older
trusted hardware designs to build a protected database,
but also does not protect access patterns. Many works
also implement variations of other analytics systems on
SGX [14, 33, 34, 52]. M2R [31] and VC3 [68] provide
MapReduce and cloud data analytics functionalities, and
HardIDX and LPAD [34, 75] build key-value stores that
are not oblivious.
General-Purpose Oblivious Computing. Zero-
Trace [67] builds ORAM-based oblivious memory
primitives over SGX, Pyramid ORAM [25] builds an
efficient ORAM for use in enclaves, and ObliVM [46]
compiles oblivious versions of programs. By specializing
data structures and operators for ORAM, ObliDB outper-
forms naı¨ve ORAM translations of database algorithms.
Wang et al. [79] optimize data structures over ORAM,
focusing on the case of recursive ORAM. Some of their
techniques could complement our indexes when using a
recursive ORAM position map. Roche et al. [64] build
a history-independent “HIRB tree” over an ORAM with
variable-sized blocks, but do not support range queries.
As seen in Section 7.1, our indexes are up to 7× more
efficient.
We use the Path ORAM [74] in our implementation, but
any other ORAM could replace it with no other changes
to the system. For indexed storage, where ORAM ac-
cesses dominate the cost of each operator, using a newer
scheme such as Ring ORAM [63] would result in perfor-
mance improvements corresponding to the approximately
1.5× improvement of Ring ORAM over Path ORAM. Un-
like Ring ORAM, other ORAM optimizations designed
for systems that provide cloud storage, such as Oblivis-
tore [73], CURIOUS [12], and TAOstore [66], focus on
reducing communication costs for the remote storage use
case, which is less applicable in ObliDB, where the trusted
and untrusted memory reside on the same device.
9 Conclusion
ObliDB closes the gap between previous enclave-based
query processing engines and oblivious indexes by com-
bining new oblivious query processing algorithms with
accompanying data structures and an oblivious query
planner. While obliviousness has a cost, ObliDB ap-
proaches practical performance: it is competitive to 19×
faster than Opaque [85] and comes within 2.6× of Spark
SQL. It also outperforms HIRB, a previous oblivious
index structure, by over 7×, completing point queries
on a 1 million row table with 3.6–9.4ms latency. Our
open source implementation of ObliDB is available at
https://github.com/SabaEskandarian/ObliDB.
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A Security Theorem
We model privacy by showing there exists a simulator
such that for all efficient adversaries A, A cannot dis-
tinguish between a real memory trace from ObliDB and
a memory trace from the simulator that is given access
to query plans and table sizes. Since the simulator only
sees what we intend to leak, the adversary cannot have
learned any additional information from interacting with
ObliDB. In this model, an (informal) theorem similar to
that of Opaque [85] also applies to ObliDB. Let D be a
dataset, S be its schema, and Q be a query. Moreover, let
OPT(D,Q) be the choice of algorithms made by ObliDB’s
query planner for query Q on data D and TRACE(D,Q)
be the distribution of transcripts of memory accesses out-
side of oblivious memory made by ObliDB while running
query Q on D. Finally, |D| denotes the size of D and
|TRACE(D,Q)| denotes the sizes of the memory traces
of running each operator in Q on D. Since ObliDB stores
intermediate tables encrypted outside of the enclave, this
includes intermediate table sizes.
Theorem 1 For all D,S,Q, and security parameter λ,
there is a poly-time simulator SIM such that for all efficient
adversaries A,
|Pr[A(SIM(|D|,S,OPT(D,Q), |TRACE(D,Q)|)) = 1]
− Pr[A(TRACE(D,Q)) = 1] | ≤ negl(λ).
The fact that SIM exists means anything that can be
learned by looking at the transcript of ObliDB running
can also be learned by looking only at the sizes of the
data/queries as well as the table schemas and physical
operators chosen by the query planner. The theorem for
padding mode replaces the data and trace size with a public
parameter indicating the size to which we pad all tables.
To argue that SIM exists, we first argue that each oper-
ator output by OPT satisfies our obliviousness property.
Next, we argue that the query planner’s operations are
oblivious with its only leakage being that inherent in the
final choice of physical operator. We provide these ar-
guments in Sections 4 and 5. With this, we have all the
pieces required to explicitly describe SIM that prints an
access pattern transcript distributed indistinguishably from
TRACE(D,Q) because the trace of query Q on dataset
D consists exactly of the accesses made by running the
planner and then the chosen operator(s).
SIM begins by reading S and |TRACE(D,Q)|. It uses
this information to simulate the access pattern of one scan
over D. This is identical to the access pattern of the query
planner. Now SIM reads OPT(D,Q) to determine which
operator to simulate. Using the provided choice of opera-
tor, the schema S, and its knowledge of input and output
table sizes gleaned from |TRACE(D,Q)|, it simulates
the access pattern described in the body of the paper for
the selected operator on D (i.e. some number of linear
scans or ORAM operations). This completes the simulated
output which is distributed indistinguishably from that of
TRACE(D,Q). The simulator SIM’ for padding mode
behaves analogously to SIM.
B ORAM Formal Definition and Path
ORAM
Oblivious RAM (ORAM), a cryptographic primitive first
proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [37], hides access
patterns to data in untrusted storage. For our purposes,
an ORAM consists of a small trusted client which resides
inside an enclave and performs reads/writes to untrusted
memory accessible by the OS. Merely encrypting data still
reveals access patterns to the data being requested or writ-
ten, which can leak private information about the data [42].
ORAM shuffles the locations of blocks in memory so re-
peated accesses to the same block and other patterns are
hidden from the adversary. Specifically, ORAM guaran-
tees that any two access patterns of the same length are
computationally indistinguishable.
Implementing ORAM. ObliDB uses the Path
ORAM [74], which operates by storing encrypted
blocks of memory in a tree structure. Every read or write
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to a block (reads and writes are indistinguishable) reads
a path from the root to a leaf, and then writes the same
path again, regardless of where in the path the desired
block sits. The contents of every node in the path are
decrypted, read, and re-encrypted. To prevent leaking
statistical information about repeated accesses to the same
address, a block is randomly reassigned to a new part of
the tree after each access. This causes ORAM reads and
writes to incur an O(logN) overhead, where N is the
ORAM’s size in blocks. If the tree lacks space to store
some node in its designated place, the node is kept in an
off-tree stash until it can find space in a future operation.
Path ORAM guarantees that the stash stays quite small
with overwhelming probability.
Recursive vs Nonrecursive ORAM. One feature of Path
ORAM requires further discussion. In order to know which
path down the tree to read to find a given block, the ORAM
client keeps a position map that maps each block of mem-
ory to a leaf in the tree that identifies the path where it can
be found. Since the size of the position map is a fixed frac-
tion of the size of the raw data, Path ORAM recursively
stores the position map in a second ORAM and repeats
until the client storage requirement becomes sufficiently
small. We call an ORAM with no recursion a nonrecur-
sive ORAM and an ORAM that recursively uses a second
ORAM a recursive ORAM. In practice, because the size
of an entry in a position map is many times smaller than
a block of data, at most one layer of recursion suffices to
store large quantities of data. For example, a 10MB posi-
tion map in our implementation can support 1.1 million
records (regardless of record size), and a 20MB position
map can store twice as many records. Adding a second
layer of recursion, where each of those 1.1 million records
represent another 1.1 million records, comes at an approx-
imately 2× performance overhead but allows the same
10MB position map to support 1.2 trillion records.
Segmenting ORAM. In addition to optimizing ORAM to
minimize storage costs, we can also optimize to reduce
computational costs. One way to do this is to separate one
ORAM into multiple smaller ORAMs in a way that the
choice of which ORAM is written to by a given opera-
tion does not leak any additional information. Although
ORAM’s computation costs scale logarithmically in the
size of a given ORAM, dramatically reducing the size of
an ORAM can still have a significant impact on perfor-
mance. For example, ObliDB uses a separate ORAM for
each table because it does not hide which tables a query
reads or modifies. This optimization could be taken further
by using a separate ORAM for an index structure and the
data for each table, or even using a separate ORAM for
each level of a B+ tree (where padding would happen on
a per-level basis rather than for the whole tree). These
optimizations do not compromise obliviousness because
the access patterns between levels of a B+ tree in a read,
insert, or delete operation, once padded to the worst case
scenario, are publicly known. The ORAM only needs to
hide which entry in a given level is accessed to preserve
obliviousness.
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